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ARTICLE
ALLAN KANNER*
Unjust Enrichment in
Environmental Litigation
They hang the man and flog the woman
That steal the goose from off the common,
But let the greater villain loose
That steals the common from the goose.
The Law demands that we atone
When we take things we do not own
But leaves the lords and ladies fine
Who take things that are yours and mine.
The poor and wretched don’t escape
If they conspire the law to break;
This must be so but they endure
Those who conspire to make the law.
The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
And geese will still a common lack
’Till they go and steal it back.
English folk poem, circa 1764
Unjust enrichment, used here in the sense of a restitutionary
remedy for tortious misconduct (a disgorgement), should play a
larger role in environmental and toxic tort litigation.  Its current
limited role owes to the fact that contemporary legal education
generally ignores equity, resulting in lawyers understanding little
about the concept.1  This is troubling because unjust enrichment
* Partner, Allan Kanner & Associates, New Orleans, LA; Senior Lecturing Fel-
low, Duke Law School, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; B.A., U.
Pennsylvania, 1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979.  The ideas expressed in this
article are the author’s and do not reflect the views of any client.
1 See PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2003) at 3:
Of the subjects which form the indispensable foundation of private law,
unjust enrichment is the only one to have evaded the great rationalization
achieved by the writers of textbooks in both England and America since
[111]
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is in theory—and could be in practice—a superior remedy in
many pollution cases involving private parties generally and pub-
lic trustees in particular.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment embodies the equitable
principle that “a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another.”2  It also rests on another eq-
uitable principle that “whatsoever it is certain a man ought to do,
that the law supposes him to have promised to do.”3
Unjust enrichment confronts the profitability of pollution. Pol-
luters’ opportunistic behavior is revealed by evidence that states
with different enforcement regimes exhibit different rates of pol-
lution, even from the same companies,4 indicating that polluters
tailor their pollution control efforts to the minimum standards
required by each state’s laws.
Unjust enrichment does many things.  For example, it shifts the
cost of pollution back to polluters who choose to subject their
neighbors to pollution, and who often refuse to clean it up
quickly.  If polluters are forced to pay only the relatively low fair-
market value (FMV) of the polluted property, they receive a de
facto subsidy to pollute.  Unjust enrichment cancels this subsidy.
the middle of the nineteenth century. . . . The consequence is that even at
the beginning of the twenty-first century unjust enrichment is still unfamil-
iar to most common lawyers.
2 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 158 A.2d 825,
827 (N.J. 1960); see also Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus. Inc., 595 A.2d 534, 549
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 219 A.2d
332, 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
3 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 158 A.2d at 827-28; Russell-Stanley Corp., 595
A.2d at 549; Callano, 219 A.2d at 334.   The doctrine of unjust enrichment is often
used to impose a quasi-contract or implied contract upon the recipient of an uncom-
pensated benefit. See VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J.
1994) (stating that unjust enrichment may allow courts to impose equitable liens);
Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 285 (N.J. 1992) (recognizing that
quasi-contract is appropriate to prevent injustice even where parties’ actions do not
manifest contractual intent).
4 Pollution also occurs due to a combination of its profitability and the lack of
enforcement mechanisms in place to prevent it.  Compliance with operational rules
(such as permitting, record keeping, and reporting requirements) is well enforced.
Other enforcement mechanisms, such as cleanup requirements, are weak.  Pollution
cleanup, including site remediation and natural-resource damages (NRD), is poorly
enforced absent a brownfield development or other economic opportunities. In the
case of site remediation, the polluter often oversees the cleanup investigation, plan-
ning, and implementation. This encourages spending money (usually on relatively
inexpensive studies) to avoid spending substantial sums of money on actual clean-
ups.  If the polluter was faced with appropriate and reliable penalties for any self-
dealing, such conduct clearly would be deterred.
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More important, unjust enrichment may be available to support
communal remedies to harms for which recovery currently is dif-
ficult under private or public law approaches.5
The novel harms created by pollution sometimes require inno-
vative remedies.  Equity, unlike law, is well suited to shaping
such remedies.  The classic example arises from the exposure of
innocent individuals to dangerous pollutants.  Although such ex-
posure will inflict real harms upon some people in the future,
what is to be done in the near-term for the larger group of ex-
posed individuals?  The New Jersey Supreme Court, among
others, answered this question by fashioning the equitable rem-
edy of medical monitoring.6
In most site-remediation and natural resource damages (NRD)
cases,7 one of the underlying causes of action will sound in tort.
The threshold question, then, is whether the particular jurisdic-
tion allows a restitutionary remedy in tort.  Part I addresses this
issue.  In addition, Part I explores the types of detriments (if any)
a plaintiff must suffer before bringing suit, as well as the nature
of the defendant’s enrichment.  In pollution cases, the defen-
dant’s enrichment generally is not direct.8  It is indirect,9 or nega-
5 An example of such remedies is medical monitoring, which allows individuals
wrongfully exposed to hazardous substances to receive continuing medical testing
for possible resultant disease. See, e.g. , Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State and
Federal Perspectives , 2 TULANE ENVT’L L. J.  1, 2-3 (1989).
6 See, e.g. , id.  at 3.
7 Excluded are cases where the plaintiff and defendant may have some pre-ex-
isting contractual relation; for example, where the plaintiff leases all or part of his
land to the defendant, and the defendant creates pollution. Such special cases may
ultimately require little or no differential treatment from what is proposed here,
depending on the particular facts of the case.  Also excluded are the operational
rules dealing with permits, record keeping, and reporting requirements.  Such ques-
tions are beyond the scope of this article.
8 I follow Dawson’s distinction on direct and indirect enrichment, as well as his
notion that restitutionary relief should not be limited to cases of direct enrichment.
JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 126-27 (1951).
9 By indirect, I mean that the plaintiff landowner has suffered some damage to his
property by virtue of the pollution.  For example, assume A dumps $1 million worth
of pollution (i.e., $1 million is the cost of appropriate offsite disposal) into the sub-
surface of B’s property, which has an FMV of $100,000. B’s damage generally can
be: (1) FMV (if the property is uninhabitable or has no FMV due to the stigma), or
(2) restitution of the property to the status quo ante. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 929 (1977).  Now assume B can still reside on the surface (his pre-pollution
use).  Leaving aside the difficulty of quantifying B’s loss, A’s de facto pollution ease-
ment is worth more than A’s loss absent a restoration measure of damages.
The notions of trespass and easement are used descriptively here.  In states where
groundwater is part of the public trust, a surface owner with a right of use suffers an
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tive, if the plaintiff suffers some lesser loss, or if the defendant’s
enrichment comes from the savings that results where the defen-
dant uses, but does not otherwise damage, the plaintiff’s prop-
erty.10  Part II explores the issue of unjust retention by examining
the shortcomings of tort remedies as well as the connection be-
tween the defendant’s enrichment and the wrong suffered by the
plaintiff.  Part III addresses whether states or Indian tribes acting
as public trustees may pursue unjust enrichment remedies in the
context of pollution-damage litigation, especially in NRD cases.
I
THE INTERPLAY OF LAW AND EQUITY IN
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION
A. Overview
Modern legal and equitable remedies share a dynamic rela-
tionship.11  Courts have used both legal and equitable remedies
to compensate traditional invasions of land interests.12  Legal
doctrines and equitable causes have evolved to promote the law’s
policy against gain by unjust enrichment.13  Property owners
injury to one aspect of his bundle of property rights. The adjacent pollution also
adversely impacts the property in these cases; the polluter, having acted without
right, has in effect seized a trespassory pollution easement.
10 Unjust enrichments involve a saving of resources by the defendant that would
have otherwise been lost if not for the nonconsensual retention or use of the plain-
tiff’s property.  For example, if a defendant trespasses on a plaintiff’s property in
order to avoid a toll road, he has been unjustly enriched.  While he did not gain
money per se, he saved money that he would otherwise have lost.  This is an indirect
unjust enrichment.
11 See, e.g. , DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973).
12 These remedies include, for instance, ejectment, Wilkerson v. Gibbs, 405 So. 2d
1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Falejczyk v. Meo, 176 N.E. 2d 10, 12 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1961); McDonald v. Stone, 321 S.W. 2d 845, 846, 850-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958));
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1 Md. 55, 58-59 (1851); and damages, City of Newark v. Eastern
Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (D.N.J. 1958); Edmands v. Olsen, 9 A.2d 860, 863-
64 (R.I. 1939); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 332 (Mont. 1925); Dougherty v.
Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (3 Dev. & Bat. 1835); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 13 (5th ed. 1984); THE RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, §§ 158, 929, 951 (1977).
13 The law of restitution developed out of the common law action for money had
and received (with roots in assumpsit and the Roman quasi ex contractu). PETER
BIRKS, THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 13-16 (2002). Equally impor-
tant was the groundbreaking work by Scott and Seavey in the American Law Insti-
tute’s Restatement of Restitution . See  Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott,
Restitution , 54 L. Q. REV. 29, 30 (1938).  Currently a “schism can be seen to divide
the scholars who write on the modern law of restitution” over the “relation between
restitution and unjust enrichment.” Although a division exists between scholars on
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have at least two approaches for unjust-enrichment restitution
claims against a polluter of private property or public natural re-
sources.14  One approach is legal and provides a restitutionary
remedy against a tortfeasor.15  The other is an equitable cause
and secures injunctive relief.16
While the unjust-enrichment claim is born of equity, it can be
both an equitable cause of action (such as for conversion or re-
plevin) and a tort remedy.17  Equitable claims for restitution ad-
dress a plaintiff’s loss.  For private parties, that loss lies in the
contamination of their property (for which they assume risk as
owners of polluted property), whereas tribes or governmental
entities lose the use of unpolluted natural resources.  A defen-
dant’s enrichment, on the other hand, is related, but not necessa-
rily equivalent, to the plaintiff’s loss. In pollution cases, for
example, the defendant’s gain is the money saved by avoiding
waste disposal and cleanup costs that, had they been incurred,
whether restitution proceeds only from unjust enrichment or whether there is “resti-
tution for wrongs, restitution for unjust enrichment, and restitution in vindication of
property rights, the majority view follows the latter view.” PETER BIRKS, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT AND WRONGFUL ENRICHMENT 2 (2001).
14 One could argue at least three.  As Professor Graham Virgo states in THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1999), there is restitution for torts, restitution
for unjust enrichment, and restitution in proprietary rights cases; accord  Douglas
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution , 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1989).
15 A tortfeasor may be held liable for a restitutionary remedy; see, e.g., KEETON
ET AL., supra  note 12, § 94, at 673.  Most states follow this approach.
16 In Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987), the
court explained:
The object of restitution is to put the parties back into the position in which
they were before the tainted transaction occurred. Restitution can be had
by harnessing either doctrines that have their origin in the common law or
those which spring from the equity side of our jurisprudence . The unifying
theme of various restitutionary tools is the prevention of unjust enrichment
. . . . It starts with the general principle that restitution will be available
whenever one has received a benefit to which another is justly entitled.
The inequity of retaining a benefit can spring from a variety of sources,
such as fraud or other unconscionable conduct in which the recipient has
received a benefit for which he has not responded with a quid pro quo.
The remedy in restitution rests on the ancient principles of disgorgement .
Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the conscious
wrongdoer to “disgorge” his gains .  Disgorgement is designed to deprive the
wrongdoer of all gains flowing from the wrong rather than to compensate
the victim of the fraud .  In modern legal usage the term has frequently been
extended to include a dimension of deterrence.  Disgorgement is said to
occur when a “defendant is made to ‘cough up’ what he got, neither more
nor less.”  (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17 See, e.g., id.  at 852 n.19.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-1\OEL106.txt unknown Seq: 6 17-APR-06 13:38
116 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 20, 2005]
would have prevented contamination of the plaintiff’s property
in the first place.
The use of restitutionary damages for pollution torts adversely
affecting another’s property is well established in the law.  The
clear rule on unjust enrichment, for example, is that a person
“who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is re-
quired to make restitution to the other.”18  The plaintiff must
“show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention
of that benefit without payment would be unjust.”19  However, to
the extent the phrase “a person shall not be allowed to enrich
himself unjustly at the expense of another” means enrichment in
fact regardless of a physical transfer,20 a different, equitable, ap-
proach is being used.
Restitutionary damages arising in tort for unjust enrichment
redress the harm to the plaintiff (here, by trespass and nuisance)
that resulted in the defendant’s enrichment.21  Pollution infringes
upon property rights and lowers property values.22  The defen-
dant, however, also benefits by avoiding disposal, subsequent in-
vestigation, and cleanup costs.  By “storing” hazardous waste on
or under another’s property, the polluter benefits in that the pol-
lution scenario is less expensive than alternatives, such as sending
the waste to a properly permitted landfill.  Thus, unjust enrich-
ment, through the equitable remedy of implied contract, also al-
18 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
19 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 1994).
20 As noted above, unjust enrichment can be direct or indirect.  Indirect unjust
enrichment, sometimes called “negative” unjust enrichment, occurs where, for ex-
ample, a defendant saves expenses by tortiously using plaintiff’s property. See
Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 936 (Wyo. 2000) (“A benefit is conferred
upon the defendant where, by tortiously using the plaintiff’s property, he saves ex-
pense or loss that might otherwise be incurred (benefit being any form of advan-
tage).  Thus, to measure negative unjust enrichment or recoverable profit, courts
may consider saving of expense.”) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146
(1888)); see also Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Okla. 1991)
(“Unjust enrichment can occur when a defendant uses something belonging to the
Plaintiff in such a way as to effectuate some kind of savings which results in or
amounts to a business profit.”) (citing DOBBS, supra  note 11, § 4.5, at 278).
21 Sometimes the victim of a wrong can claim a restitutionary remedy on both
equitable and legal grounds.  For example, if a wrongdoer comes onto one’s prop-
erty and takes one’s money without consent, the wrongdoer is liable for both the tort
of trespass and, independently, the unjust enrichment which consists in what was
taken.
22 The tort system attempts to accomplish the goals of compensation, allocation of
cost, and deterrence. See Diane P. Wood, Commentary on the Futures Problem , 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1933 (2000).
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lows recovery of the benefit conferred upon the defendant by
virtue of his tortious use of the plaintiff’s land.23  The legal fiction
of an implied contract provides the plaintiff with an opportunity
to benefit from the defendant’s use of his land.  Even if the par-
ties never had a contact with one another or met any of the gen-
eral requirements for creation of a contract, a court may find an
implied contract where it finds the defendant’s profit off the
plaintiff’s land to be unjust.24
Because tort law recognizes alternate remedies, some plaintiffs
are entitled to “waive the tort” and recover the wrongdoer’s
gain.25  Consider the wrongful invasion of property rights.  Un-
just enrichment occurs when a defendant uses something belong-
ing to the plaintiff in such a way as to effectuate some kind of
savings, resulting in a business profit.26  Prosser explains that,
under this approach to unjust enrichment, the restitution is an
alternative to tort liability, and unsuccessful pursuit of the im-
plied-contract theory will not bar a later action for the restitutio-
nary remedy under tort itself.27  The implied-contract doctrine
also applies in cases where there has been outright occupation
and use by a trespasser, like the case of a polluter taking a pollu-
tion easement without consent:
23 See  Laycock, supra  note 14, at 1280; see also JAMES FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES 303 (1999) (“The essence of unjust enrichment and its correlative remedy
of restitution is the recovery of the benefit realized by the defendant not the harm or
injury sustained by the plaintiff.”); accord  Laycock, supra note 14, at 1282-83.
24 See Commerce P’ship 8098 Ltd. P’ship v. Equity Contracting Co., Inc., 695 So.
2d 383, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).  In the case of pollution, this raises the issue of
how to measure the plaintiff’s value in not having the land polluted by the
defendant.
25 The invasion of one’s property by pollution allows suit in tort for either the
FMV of the property or the diminution in FMV (the costs of restoring one’s land to
its pre-injury condition) even if those costs far exceed the amount by which the
land’s value has been diminished (at least where repair is possible and likely to be
carried out). See, e.g. , Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475
(La. 1991); Roman Catholic Church v. La. Gas Serv. Co., 618 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1977).   The use-and-enjoyment inter-
est in land might be invaded both by trespass and nuisance. Again, the measure of
damages may be diminution in market value or cost of repair or abatement. See
Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource
Damage Actions , 30 COLUM. J. ENVT. L. 417 (2005).
26 Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Okla. 1991) (citing DOBBS,
supra  note 11, § 4.5, at 278).
27 KEETON ET AL., supra  note 12, § 94, at 672-73; accord , Barbouti v. Lysandrou,
559 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Keeton with approval). The
difference between implied contracts based upon tort and those based upon contract
was discussed in Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 788 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
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[T]here has developed the doctrine that where the commission
of a tort results in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at
the plaintiff’s expense, the plaintiff may disregard, or “waive”
the tort action, and sue instead on a theoretical and fictitious
contract of restitution of the benefits which the defendant has
so received.  “Waiver” of the tort is an unfortunate term, since
the quasi-contract action itself is still based on the tort, and
there is merely an election between alternative, co-existing
remedies, and the unsuccessful pursuit of the “implied” con-
tract will not bar a later action for the tort itself.28
Particularly victimized by pollution are the poor and under-
privileged classes of our society.  Native Americans and other ra-
cial minorities have suffered what has become known as
environmental racism.29  A high percentage of Native Americans
and African Americans live near toxic and solid-waste dumps.30
Polluters’ attraction to these communities compounds the socie-
tal inequities they already suffer.  Because these minorities are
less likely to be educated social activists, and thus, unlikely to
contest the dumping, polluters see them as a good target for their
dumping.31  Native American tribes seeking to improve their ec-
onomic situations have not been in strong positions to question
polluters’ offers and, once agreements are made, they have not
been in a good position to later challenge polluters for their envi-
ronmental rights.32
28 KEETON ET AL., supra  note 12; accord , Barbouti, 559 So. 2d at 650 (citing Kee-
ton with approval); see also VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526
(N.J. 1994) (stating that unjust enrichment may allow a court to impose an equitable
lien); Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 285 (recognizing that quasi-
contract is appropriate to prevent injustice even where parties’ actions do not mani-
fest contractual intent). The Restatement of Restitution  also notes the doctrine’s ex-
tension to cases where a corporation employs eminent domain to take possession of
land without using the statutory procedure, where valuable soil has been removed,
or where cattle have been grazing upon the land, irrespective of any damage done to
it.
29 Linda D. Blank, Seeking Solutions to Environmental Inequity: The Environmen-
tal Justice Act , 24 ENVTL. L. 1109, 1136 (1994).
30 Id . at 1110-12; Allan Kanner et al., New Opportunities for Native American
Tribes to Pursue Environmental and Natural Resource Claims , 14 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 155, 156 (2003); Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource
Damages , 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 93 (2004).
31 Allan Kanner, Equity in Toxic Tort Litigation: Unjust Enrichment and the Poor ,
26 L. & POL’Y 209, 217 (2004).
32 Kanner, New Opportunities for Native American Tribes to Pursue Environmen-
tal and Natural Resource Claims , supra note 30, at 157.
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B. The Restitutionary Award in Tort
The focus here will be on the use of restitutionary damages for
pollution torts adversely affecting one’s property.  Given the
proper circumstances, restitution is available in contract, tort,
and other actions in law or equity.33  With respect to tort, com-
pensatory damages are those “awarded to a person as compensa-
tion, indemnity, or restitution for harm sustained by him.”34
While different, these three are all accepted tort remedies.35
Restitution generally restores either the thing gained by the
taking or the thing taken or lost, including the value of the use of
the thing taken during the period of misappropriation.  If, for ex-
ample, I steal a camera you acquired for $50 and then sell it for
$100, your restitution (e.g., by an action for constructive trust or
for accounting of profit) is $100 (the money gained from the
property wrongfully taken).  Since the plaintiff’s property was
used to produce the money, that money can be thought of as a
new form of the plaintiff’s property.
In property pollution cases, plaintiffs can seek damages in one
of the two ways: (1) by making the defendant pay restoration
plus fair-rental value during the de facto taking period (from the
onset of pollution to its cleanup),36 or (2) by making the defen-
dant pay substitutionary restitution (i.e., making the tortfeasor
restore what has been substituted for the damaged property in
the form of money).37  In many cases, restoration is expensive
33 See  22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages  § 34 (1988); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,
§§ 150-54 (1936); GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, § 1.1 at 2 (1978).
Restitution is also the remedy in actions for replevin or ejectment.
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977).  Tort damages may be com-
pensatory as well as nominal or punitive. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 347 (2d ed. 1998).
35 Under conventional wisdom, restitution is defined as, “a common law remedy
by which the court can, in its discretion, restore the injured party to a previous posi-
tion, return something to the rightful owner, or restore the status quo.” The defini-
tion goes on to say, “[i]n torts, restitution is used to prevent unjust enrichment at the
expense of others.” GILBERT’S POCKET SIZE LAW DICTIONARY 290 (1st ed. 1997).
36 See, e.g. , Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991);
Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co., 354 P.2d 1031 (Mont. 1960) (granting restoration
damages if pollution can be cleaned).
37 This supposes the land can be cleaned.  An older line of cases suggests that with
permanent pollution-damages, the tort recovery should be diminution in property
value. However, these cases do not often consider the unjust-enrichment principle,
and predate concerns about the neighboring landowner’s own pollution liabilities
and social concerns about eliminating uncontrolled pollution from the environment.
What often animates these decisions is trepidation regarding the enormity of the
restoration or cleanup costs or their lack of proportionality to the underlying wrong.
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and exceeds both the FMV of the property and the amount of
the tortfeasor’s unjust enrichment.38  Under similar circum-
stances, tort law regularly embraces pragmatic and equitable
remedies.  Medical-monitoring tort remedies are an example.39
Notable, except in implied and quasi-contract cases, is the super-
ficial uncertainty around designating medical monitoring a cause
of action as opposed to a remedy.40  The better analysis treats it
as a restitutionary remedy.41  Unlike a legal remedy for past
harm, equitable relief is used to avoid future harm.  Medical-sur-
veillance relief is an equitable goal mitigating future harm.
The unjust-enrichment principle avoids this.  Subject to an exception allowing for
disproportionate restoration costs to protect personal values, the Restatement of
Torts  takes the position that replacement is a suitable measure, unless this is wholly
disproportionate to the land value.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 929, cmt. b (1939).
38 Under Florida law, a suit for wrongful injury to property by a private land-
owner will only allow for damages amounting to the actual diminution of value to
the property.  This achieves the goal of not overcompensating the plaintiffs in these
claims. Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1317-18 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
However, there is a limited public policy exception to the rule.  Davey Compressor
Co. v. City of Delray Beach, 639 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1994) (damage to the property
resulted in impairment of public drinking water supply and compensation to the city
exceeded the property value).
39 About fifteen years ago, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the seminal
case on medical-surveillance relief, Ayers v. Township of Jackson , 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987). Ayers established that medical surveillance should facilitate early diagnosis
and treatment of disease and deter polluters who may otherwise avoid liability for
injuries resulting years after exposure. The court eliminated the need for proof of
current injury, stating an “application of tort law that allows post injury, pre-symp-
tom recovery” is entirely appropriate in the unique and complex area of toxic tort
litigation. Id.  at 311. Ayers  also made a careful distinction between a claim for en-
hanced risk of future harm and medical surveillance.  An enhanced-risk claim seeks
recovery for an unquantified injury that may or may not occur in the future. A medi-
cal-surveillance claim, by contrast, seeks recovery for the cost of periodic medical
examinations a plaintiff would not have to undergo absent an exposure to toxic
chemicals, according to Ayers .  Id.  at 312-13.  Since then, claims for medical surveil-
lance have been asserted with increasing frequency.
40 Many related issues are still in flux, as noted by Samuel Goldblatt and Laurie
Styka Bloom, A Primer on Medical Monitoring , Products Liability: ALI ABA
Course of Study 247, 249 (2001), discussing whether a medical-surveillance claim is
an independent cause of action, and is appropriate for treatment as a class action.
41 In New Jersey, courts appear to treat medical surveillance as an element of
damages. For example, in Coffman v. Keene Corp ., 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993), the
court recognized medical-surveillance damages for breach of duty to warn.  In Fayer
v. Keene Corp ., 709 A.2d 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), the court allowed
medical-surveillance damages in a products liability suit. Ayers  specifically referred
to medical surveillance as a “compensable item of damages” rather than a cause of
action. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312. Had the courts sought to create a new cause of
action in tort for medical surveillance, they would most likely have made that desire
clear, given that the Ayers  court spent considerable energy rejecting “plaintiffs’
cause of action” for the enhanced risk of disease. Id . at 307-08.
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Many contend that the best case regarding the current inter-
play between law and equity in toxic tort litigation is Ayers v.
Jackson Township.42  The court recognized that the outer limits
of liability are not defined by old common-law strictures.43 In
Ayers , pollution entered neighboring drinking wells, causing an
unreasonable (but otherwise unquantifiable) risk of future per-
sonal injury.44  Rather than allowing a  speculative tort remedy
for the increased risk, the court charged the polluter with the
reasonable cost of a medical-monitoring program to mitigate or
avoid future physical harms to the plaintiffs.45 Ayers  applied a
restitutionary remedy in a strict-liability context.  Although ear-
lier cases had awarded medical monitoring, Ayers  articulated the
equitable nature of this relief while refusing to label the cause of
action equitable.  The most important part of the Ayers  legacy is
42 525 A.2d at 287.
43 By way of background, the analysis undertaken by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors , 625 A.2d 1110, 1114-1116 (N.J. 1993)
albeit a premises liability case, is very helpful here:
Because public policy and social values evolve over time, so does the com-
mon law. “The power of growth is inherent in the common law.” For that
reason, the common law cannot be immutable or inflexible. “One of the
great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it adapta-
ble to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court.”
. . . [I]n a case such as this in which the legal relationships are not precisely
defined, the attempt to pigeonhole the parties within the traditional catego-
ries of the common law is both strained and awkward. Moreover, to analo-
gize the status of the parties to the common law classifications holds no
great comfort that the analysis will center on factors that will lead to a
sound principle of tort liability. In determining premises liability “the com-
mon law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations
which should govern determination of the question of duty.” . . . [R]esort to
the common law methodology with its insistence on traditional classifica-
tions in this setting is not especially instructive and does not necessarily
provide reliable guidance in determining the existence and scope of the
duty of care that should be ascribed to a broker . . . . Whether a person
owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the impo-
sition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of
the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.  That inquiry
involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the relation-
ship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and
ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.
The analysis is both very fact-specific and principled; it must lead to solu-
tions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelli-
gible and sensible rules to govern future conduct.
(citations omitted).
44 525 A.2d at 291.
45 Id . at 315.
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that the value of the restitutionary remedy need not equal the
value of the tortfeasor’s benefit.
Substitutionary restoration, as opposed to specific restora-
tion,46 provides financial compensation to the pollution victim.
A substitutionary restitution, however, is not often a desirable or
fair remedy.  In some cases, as the example of the stolen camera
shows, the plaintiff gets more than he actually paid in the first
place.47  However, through use of substitutionary restoration, the
law succeeds in deterring the wrongdoer by preventing profit
from wrongdoing.  Traditional damages focus only on the plain-
tiff’s loss, whereas restitution aims at disgorging benefits from
the defendant that would be unjust for him to keep.48  The plain-
tiff’s windfall recovery in the camera hypothetical is acceptable
because it prevents the defendant’s unjust enrichment.  This de-
terrence is not punitive as it imposes no liability on the defendant
beyond the gain from the wrong.
In pollution cases, the defendant is taking a de facto pollution
easement for private gain, and thus is receiving a benefit without
compensating anyone.  In Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp. , for exam-
ple, the defendants used others’ property as a de facto waste dis-
posal site without prior consent or payment for that privilege.49
The court held that unjust enrichment, and the predicate of un-
just benefit, occurred in the context of pollution:
Unjust enrichment can occur when a defendant uses some-
thing belonging to the Plaintiff in such a way as to effectuate
some kind of savings which results in or amounts to a business
profit. . . . Defendant[s] used Plaintiffs’ property to dispose of
pollutants and saved the expenses of otherwise collecting and
disposing of same.50
46 Courts occasionally speak the language of specific restoration (e.g ., constructive
trust), even though there is no res or property to which a trust might attach. In these
cases, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is really being used to effect a substitution-
ary restitution. See, e.g., Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1955).
47 See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965) (stolen securities).
48 Medical monitoring is a different sort of restitutionary remedy. Such surveil-
lance is compensation for diagnostic tests to detect latent injuries when the plaintiff
has an enhanced risk of injury due to a defendant’s tortious conduct. The claim
departs from traditional common law tort principles because a present physical in-
jury generally is not required for entitlement to the claim. In re  Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1990).
49 778 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
50 Id . at 35-36; see also , Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888).
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Both state and federal constitutional law bars the taking of
property without showing public necessity and a prior payment
of just compensation.  The unilateral seizure of a pollution ease-
ment would appear to be a taking of property.  Unjust-enrich-
ment remedies impose a quasi-contract or implied contract upon
the recipient of this type of uncompensated benefit.51  This equi-
table solution is necessary because there is no actual negotiation
and agreement between polluter and pollutee prior to the pol-
luter’s unjust taking or use of the pollutee’s land.
Unjust enrichment rests on the equitable principle that “what-
soever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the law supposes
him to have promised to do.”52  Whether the enrichment is un-
just turns on whether “the defendant has received benefits that in
equity and good conscience it ought not to keep.”53  Here, the
benefit to defendant is the money saved by imposing an external-
ity on the plaintiff, for example, by avoiding the cost of a pollu-
tion easement.
The “polluter pays” concept works well with unjust-enrich-
ment principles to discipline recalcitrant polluters and reestab-
lishes parity among competitors.  The unjust-enrichment measure
of damages provides the same incentives as a Pigouvian tax: if a
polluter knows that he will be held liable for the greater of either
the damages or the illicit profits his activities create, then he will
have the proper incentive in the future to avoid such damages or
profits.  At the same time, unjust enrichment plays—and has
played—an important role in protecting property rights.54
51 At common law, the reasonable use doctrine governed the use of resources,
such as groundwater, that were shared by neighbors. See  61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution
Control  § 1987 (1999). Avoidable pollution is not a reasonable use. See, e.g. , Miller
v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.Supp. 976, 1004 (D. Kan. 1984).
52 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 158 A.2d 825, 827-28 (N.J.
1960); Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus. Inc., 595 A.2d 534, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991); Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 219 A.2d 332, 334 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
53 R. Lisle Baker & Michael J. Markoff, By-Products Liability: Using Common
Law Private Actions to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
99, 115 (1986); see also 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts  § 3 (1973)
(right of recovery is essentially equitable).
54 Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 778 F. Supp. 35, 36 (W.D. Okla. 1991) (citing
DOBBS, supra  note 11, § 4.5, at 273).
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C. Historical Background
The restitutionary remedy emerged from both law and eq-
uity.55 The common-law action for assumpsit led to an implied
assumpsit or quasi-contract action, an early form of restitution.
At the same time, equity developed many remedies to secure res-
titution, such as constructive trusts, accounting for profits, equita-
ble liens, and subrogation.  Over time, notwithstanding
occasional erroneous application of formalistic exceptions and
technicalities, these strands came together, and the law moved
from a series of discrete cubbyholes to a general restitutionary or
unjust-enrichment principle.56
An example of formalistic error is the outdated idea that, ab-
sent a landlord/tenant relationship, there can be no restitution
“in assumpsit” for mere use and occupation of land.57 An initial
distinction was drawn between a trespasser gaining tangible
property during a trespass and one who did not.  In the former
case, the reasonable value of that tangible property (plus inter-
est) during time of use generally was recoverable: (1) under a
conversion theory,58 (2) by waiving the tort and suing in assump-
sit,59 or (3) under a theory of preventing unjust enrichment.60
This rule eventually expanded to allow recovery for nonconsen-
sual use of another’s land, even absent the removal of tangible
goods, where the trespasser has profited or saved expenses.61
The reasons for going beyond mere trespass or ejectment reme-
dies to the broader unjust-enrichment principle can be traced to
both procedural reforms abolishing the limitations on implied-
55 DOBBS, supra  note 11, § 4.2, at 229.
56 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
57 See, e.g. , Hurley v. Lameraux, 12 N.W. 447 (1882); A.M. Swarthout, Annota-
tion, Implied Contract in Case of Trespass Upon Real Property , 167 A.L.R. 796
(2004). Obviously, a remedy for trespass (damages, usually rental value) or eject-
ment (a legal remedy, albeit one for specific relief) existed.
58 See, e.g. , Newhart v. Pierce, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Klein
v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 151 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (dictum).
Even if the item converted was worthless, nominal damages were allowed. E.g.,
Winkler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 168 A.2d 418, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1961).  This line of cases is different than if the property has fluctuating
value. E.g., Klein , 151 So. 2d at 879.
59 Here, the notion of waiver was based on the legal fiction that the sale was made
with consent on the victim’s behalf. E.g., Lamine v. Dorrell, 92 Eng. Rep. 303, 304
(K.B. 1705); Miller v. Miller, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 133, 135-36 (1828).
60 See, e.g., Franks v. Lockwood, 150 A.2d 215, 218 (Conn. 1959).
61 See, e.g., Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r., 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1031 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936);
Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 235 (Va. 1946).
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assumpsit actions and a substantive desire to transcend the limi-
tations of transitional legal fictions.  Today, the unjust-enrich-
ment principle applies in all land cases.62
Restitutionary awards may be appropriate, regardless of
whether the defendant physically denudes the property (e.g., of
trees or topsoil) or simply uses it without consent.  In use cases,
monetary damages are often the reasonable rental value of the
property.63  This is generally the only value taken; thus, recourse
to unjust enrichment is not necessary in most non-causal use
cases.  Where, however, a benefit inures to the tortfeasor in an
amount greater than the rental value, courts allow suits for those
higher profits in order to prevent unjust enrichment.64 This
value is sometimes difficult to calculate. Felder v. Reeth  ad-
dresses damages for restitution where there is no market to as-
sess the property value at the time the property was used.65
Under such circumstances, the value is determined using the
nearest market, plus interest from the date of taking.66  Moreo-
ver, without a market for such rentals (here, pollution ease-
ments), the defendant’s profits may be the only measure of
reasonable rental value.67  Even where the defendant’s value or
benefit is too difficult to prove, a plaintiff generally may recover
as if he had entered into a contract.68  The test asks: for what
would the parties have contracted at the relationship’s inception
if both sides were fully informed?69  The answer clearly is up to
$1.00 less than the actual benefit of the polluting activity, assum-
ing there are no other transaction costs.  Whether the victim
would have consented to that amount is not clear.  However, the
62 However, as discussed infra , there still may be reasonable debates about what
constitutes an enrichment, how to measure it, and whether its retention is unjust.
Suffice it to say that, in many cases, a rental value akin to trespass damages may
satisfy the felt intuitions about justice animating the unjust-enrichment principle.
63 E.g.,  Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 778 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
64 Edwards, 96 S.W. 2d at 1031.
65 Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
66 Id.  at 748.
67 See generally, Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 127 A. 375 (Vt. 1925) (finding that,
where rental value of property taken does not fully compensate plaintiff, profits may
also be recovered such that gains prevented as well as loses sustained are awarded to
plaintiff).  For further discussion regarding valuation, see  Allan Kanner & Tibor
Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions , 30
COLUM. J. ENVT. L. 417 (2005).
68 Campbell v. TVA, 421 F.2d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 1969)(citing George P. Costigan,
Implied-in-Fact Contracts , 33 HARV. L. REV. 376, 387 (1920)).
69 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1957).
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jury generally will decide this matter based on the evidence
presented.  This analysis brings aspects of quasi-contract to the
tort analysis.
To recover under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the plain-
tiff must “show both that defendant received a benefit and that
retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.”70
As explained by the court in VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp. ,
however, the doctrine also “requires that plaintiff show that it
expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it per-
formed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure
of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual
rights.”71  Explained another way, in successfully applying the
doctrine of unjust enrichment, “a common thread . . . [is] that the
plaintiff expected remuneration from the defendant, or if the true
facts were known to plaintiff , he would have expected remunera-
tion from the defendant, at the time the benefit was conferred.”72
Courts historically have recognized that continuous trespasses
render available remedies at law inadequate, thus permitting the
use of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.  As observed by the
court in Rayhertz Amusement Corp. v. Fulton Improvement Co. :
Equity’s jurisdiction to enjoin continuous trespass is well es-
tablished.  Courts of law are not by reason of the nature of
their processes able to give complete and adequate relief
through actions at law for trespass.  Complainant is entitled to
the enjoyment of the demised premises in the position in
which it was before the defendants encroached upon it, and to
quiet and peaceful possession thereof.73
70 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 1994).
71 Id .
72 Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 219 A.2d 332, 334-35 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1966) (emphasis added); see also Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Wallia, 511
A.2d 709, 716-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (recognizing that remuneration
expectation may be constructively satisfied).
73 200 A. 557, 560 (N.J. Ch. 1938) (internal citations omitted); see also Bellemead
Dev. Corp. v. Schneider, 472 A.2d 170, 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (stating
that courts have “the power and duty to issue an injunction where a continuing tres-
pass is threatened”), aff’d , 483 A.2d 830 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Jersey
City Med. Ctr. v. Halstead, 404 A.2d 44, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (“Equity
will in proper cases enjoin a continuing trespass or series of trespasses if an action
for damages would provide an inadequate remedy.”); Capone v. Ranzulli, 134 A.
553, 553 (N.J. Ch. 1926) (“Equity will enjoin continuous trespass, where the injury is
irreparable.”); Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 177 S.W.2d 728, 732-33 (Ark.
1944) (recognizing that defendant’s continuous trespasses onto plaintiff’s land ren-
dered plaintiff’s remedy at law inadequate and finding that equity had jurisdiction to
issue injunction against defendant’s actions).
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Moreover, in Kruvant v. 12-22 Woodland Ave. Corp ., the court
implicitly utilized an implied contract theory to prevent unjust
enrichment.74  In that case, an adjoining landowner sued a riding
club for the impermissible use of his land for a bridle trail and
dressage field.75  Although the court determined that the club did
not have a prescriptive easement for the dressage field, it held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for the multiple
trespasses by the club’s members because he failed to show any
actual damage to the land.76  However, because the landowner
bore the costs of maintaining the land (e.g., taxes), the court con-
cluded “that where a person uses the land of another to carry on
profit-making activities, without permission, the landowner
should be able to recover a reasonable rent.”77  Thus, the court
held, albeit implicitly, that the club had been unjustly enriched by
its use of the plaintiff’s land because it had not paid any of the
expenses associated with that land.
At least one court in New Jersey has also recognized that an
implied contract is available to recover the costs of abatement in
environmental pollution matters and to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.  In Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Industries Inc., tenants
sought to recover the costs of remediation against the landlord
for contamination caused by a prior tenant.78  The landlord
sought to dismiss the tenants’ claim for unjust enrichment be-
cause: 1) the landlord was unaware of any contamination until
after the tenant took possession of the property; 2) there was
privity of contract between the landlord and tenant; and 3) the
tenant had voluntarily agreed to clean up the site.79  At the out-
set, the court rejected the landlord’s contentions.  It found that
privity did not prevent recovery based upon unjust enrichment
because any contract between the parties did encompass the
scope of the pollution on the property.80  Implicitly relying on
equitable principles, the court also determined that “it does not
seem just to deem compliance with an [Environmental Cleanup
74 See 350 A.2d 102, 115 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff’d , 376 A.2d 188 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
75 Id . at 104-05.
76 Id . at 114.
77 Id . at 115; see also Mandia v. Applegate, 708 A.2d 1211, 1217 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (recognizing the reasonable rental rule announced in Kruvant).
78 Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus. Inc., 595 A.2d 534, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991).
79 Id . at 550.
80 Id .
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and Responsibility Act] based cleanup plan, entered into under
the auspices of a state administrative agency, to be the same as a
voluntary agreement amongst parties.”81  With regard to the ac-
tual elements of unjust enrichment, it found that the landlord
benefited from the cleanup, but held that there was still a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether the landlord’s failure to
pay for the cleanup costs was unjust.82
Disgorgement of profits is also an accepted approach in equity
to prevent unjust enrichment.83  In various contexts, courts have
permitted plaintiffs to recover a defendant’s ill-gotten gains by
requiring the disgorgement of profits reasonably created by the
defendant’s wrongful conduct.  For example, in State v. Darby,  an
issue existed as to whether a court had the authority to disgorge
profits under New Jersey’s security laws.84  In answering this
question in the affirmative, the appellate division recognized that
“[t]he authority to order disgorgement of unlawful gains is inher-
ent in the historic equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court,
Chancery Division.”85
Similarly, in Platinum Management, Inc. v. Dahms , the court
held that for a claim for intentional interference with economic
advantage, a plaintiff may seek to recover those profits reasona-
bly related to the tortious conduct.86  It explained that the dis-
gorgement of profits was based upon the policy that “[t]he
wrongdoer should not be permitted, by misappropriating an-
81 Id .
82 Id .
83 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987). See In re Investors Dev. Co., 7
B.R. 772, 775 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (“It is well settled that equity will disgorge an
unjust enrichment.”);  Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla.
1987):
The remedy in restitution rests on the ancient principles of disgorgement.
Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the conscious
wrongdoer to “disgorge” his gains.  Disgorgement is designed to deprive
the wrongdoer of all gains flowing from the wrong rather than to compen-
sate the victim of the fraud .
84 587 A.2d 1309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
85 Id.  at 1317; see  Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 233-34
(N.J. 1952) (holding that the court could order disgorgement of profits under gen-
eral principles of equity); Hartman v. Hartle, 122 A. 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (determin-
ing that a constructive trust would be created to recover profits from the illegal sale
of property); Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 205 A.2d 744, 745 (N.J. 1964) (observing
that a landowner may recover “compensation for some benefit the defendant may
have garnered by a wrongful act unattended by depreciation of the value of the
strip”).
86 666 A.2d 1028, 1044-1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
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other’s opportunity, to use that opportunity in order to help ab-
sorb fixed expenses of its own business.”87
The detriment to the state is the subsurface pollution, which
undeniably hurts property rights and property values.  The bene-
fit to the defendants is the substantial economic savings on prior
pollution, subsequent investigation, and non-cleanup.  As a mat-
ter of law, it is unjust for defendants to take and retain that
benefit.88
D. The Role of Unjust Enrichment in
Protecting Property Rights
As indicated, unjust enrichment allows a landowner to sue a
tortfeasor for a wrongful interference with property rights.89  A
property90 owner may sue when another interferes with the
owner’s interest in the physical integrity,91 use and enjoyment, or
exclusive possession of his land.92  The classic example of the
misappropriation of another’s land is the case in which the defen-
dant severs fixtures, crops, timber, minerals, earth or other com-
ponents from the plaintiff’s land.  When the plaintiff learns of
this unlawful taking or trespass and conversion, he sues for the
defendant’s resultant benefit, and in most cases prevails.93  We
can use this situation as a heuristic device to flesh out our think-
ing about unjust enrichment.
Under the Restatement, the existence of “wrongfulness” is key
to the defendant’s liability in restitution.  Specifically, where the
timber is cut willfully or in bad faith, the plaintiff recovers the
enhanced value of the trespass without deducting any of the de-
87 Id.  at 1046 (quoting Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1412 (3rd
Cir. 1985)); see also Gillette Co. v. Two Guys from Harrison, Inc., 177 A.2d 555, 560
(N.J. 1962) (holding that plaintiff could recover profits derived from violations of
the Fair Trade Act to prevent unjust enrichment).
88 See  cases Part I. C. supra.
89 PALMER, supra  note 33, § 2.10, at 138 (citing Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.
2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
90 “Property,” as used herein refers to interests in land.  The rules in land cases
may be somewhat different from the rules in personal-property cases.
91 See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1977) (if restoration dam-
ages disproportionately exceed the diminished value of the land, then damages are
limited to that diminution, unless the land is used for a “purpose personal to the
owner”). Id . at § 929 cmt. b.
92 See, e.g. , Exxon Corp. v. Dunn, 474 So. 2d 1269, 1273 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing damages as reduced market value due to nuisance).
93 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 129 cmt. d (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF RESTITUTION § 45(4) and cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 2 1984).
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fendant’s costs.94  By way of background, the value of standing
trees is usually termed “stumpage value.”95  The value of that
timber after the defendant has engaged in the costly process of
cutting it down, removing it, and hauling the wood is called “en-
hanced value.”96  Typically, the enhanced value is greater than
the stumpage value.
Absent wrongfulness or bad faith, the plaintiff at least will get
the stumpage value.97  However, bad faith or wrongfulness prop-
erly raises the stakes for the tortfeasor, who risks forfeiting all
proceeds of the misconduct.98  The law consistently treats the in-
tentional tortfeasor or bad-faith actor more harshly.  Such actors
can and should be deterred.99  (This is less likely with inadver-
tent, mistaken, or emergency-respondent trespassers).100
E. Federal Analogies
The federal government recognizes the importance of prevent-
ing polluters’ unjust enrichment.  Federal law provides some
complementary remedies to recoup unjust enrichment.  For ex-
ample, recovery of economic benefit, plus a penalty that reflects
the “gravity” or seriousness of the violation, is the foundation of
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) penalty policy
across all environmental statutes.101  The EPA, pursuant to stat-
ute-specific programs, has developed individual policies imple-
menting this generic penalty policy.  In Civil Penalty Policy for
Section 311(b)(3) and Section 311(j) of the Clean Water Act , the
EPA adjusts the gravity figure by calculating “the economic ben-
94 See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Williamson, 404 So. 2d 565, 568 (Miss. 1981); H.D.
Warren, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Destruction or Injury to Trees and
Shrubbery , 161 A.L.R. 549 (1919); V. Woerner, Annotation, Right of Trespasser to
Credit for Expenditures in Producing, As Against His Liability for Value of, Oil or
Minerals , 21 A.L.R. 2d 380 (1952) [hereinafter Minerals]; DAN B. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 5.3(3) (2d ed.
1993).
95 Masonite , 404 So. 2d at 568.
96 Id .
97 Id .
98 Id .
99 See , e.g. , Minerals , supra  note 94, at § 5.
100 Masonite , 404 So. 2d at 568.
101 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CIVIL PENALTY POLICY FOR SECTION 311(B)(3) AND SECTION 311(J) OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1998), http://epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/
cwa/311pen.pdf.
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efit or savings accruing to the violator by the noncompliance.”102
The purpose of this adjustment is to recapture the economic ben-
efit or savings in order to prevent violators “of environmental
laws from having any financial incentive to disregard its legal
obligations.”103
In order to deter would-be polluters, it is crucial to remove the
economic incentives of polluting.  Federal courts have almost
unanimously recognized the importance of economic benefit in
establishing appropriate penalties that deter future violations.
The primary area of litigation has been under the Clean Water
Act (CWA).  For example in United States v. Municipal Authority
of Union Township , the court specifically recognized that the
goal of deterrence requires that a penalty have both an eco-
nomic-benefit component to ensure that the violator does not
profit from its violation of the law, as well as a punitive compo-
nent to account for the degree of seriousness and/or willfulness
of the violations.104
The court in United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. , followed
the same logic in imposing a penalty of $12.6 million, the largest
environmental civil penalty in history.105  The economic benefit
portion alone was $4.2 million.106  The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the district court’s approach in calculating the
economic-benefit component.107
State courts also have adopted the federal courts’ treatment of
economic benefit.  For example, one Connecticut court noted:
“First, [a penalty] should include the ‘economic benefit of non-
compliance’; otherwise, the violator and potential violators
would perceive that it pays to violate the law, creating an obvious
disincentive for compliance.”108
1. Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act
Unjust enrichment is not a penalty at common law because the
wrongdoer is only giving back what was unjustly acquired.  Thus,
no out-of-pocket penalty truly occurs.  By contrast, federal law
102 Id . at 16.
103 Id .
104 929 F. Supp. 800, 806 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d  150 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1998).
105 972 F. Supp. 338, 352-54 (E.D. Va. 1997).
106 Id . at 349.
107 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 1999).
108 Keeney v. Durable Wire, Inc., No. CV 91 0399750S, 1995 WL 542161, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1995).
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views disgorgement of the economic benefits resulting from  non-
compliance with environmental laws as a factor (along with the
gravity of the violation) in setting penalties.  For example, the
EPA has interpreted the penalty factors of section 113(e) of the
Clear Air Act (CAA) in its CAA Penalty Policy.109  The policy
directs the calculation of two basic components of a penalty, one
representing the “economic benefit of noncompliance,” and the
other representing the “gravity” of the violation.110
However, the primary area of litigation has been under the
CWA.  In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
(P.I.R.G.) v. Magnesium Elektron,  the court determined the eco-
nomic benefit derived from a CWA violation.111  The plaintiff’s
expert (Dr. Michael Kavanaugh) calculated the economic benefit
as the after-tax present value of the expenditures the company
avoided or delayed by not complying with the relevant laws.112
He testified that this is virtually identical to the EPA methodol-
ogy, and that he uses this methodology when he serves as the
federal government’s economic-benefit expert in its CWA en-
forcement cases.113  The district court wrote:
Using this methodology, Dr. Kavanaugh determined the eco-
nomic benefit to defendant of not hauling its wastewater to
Trenton from 1984 to 1989 and of not installing and operating
an evaporator from 1984 to 1989 . . . . In determining the after-
tax present value of these expenditures, Dr. Kavanaugh
treated the expenditures as either “avoided” or “delayed.” . . .
He explained that an avoided expenditure is an expenditure
that the company totally avoided by not complying with its
Clean Water Act permit, such as expenditures for operation
and maintenance or hauling . . . . He testified that a delayed
expenditure is an expenditure that a company was able to de-
lay but not totally avoid by not coming into compliance with
the Act, such as the cost of capital equipment.114
109 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CAA STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL PENALTY POLICY (1991), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/penpol.pdf.
110 Id .
111 No. 89-3193, 1995 WL 461252, at *12-16 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 1995).
112 Id . at *12.
113 Id . at *13.
114 Id.  at *14.  The court additionally explained:
Dr. Kavanaugh explained that he determines the after-tax present value of
avoided expenditures by determining the total amount of the expenditures,
applying an “opportunity cost” to determine the present value of those ex-
penditures, and subtracting the money which the company would have
saved in taxes if it had actually made those expenditures and been able to
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The court accepted the methodology and used it to calculate
civil penalties against the defendant, noting that, in regard to the
CWA:
The penalty must at least reflect the proven economic benefit.
That is the starting point.  Then the other § 309(d) factors are
used to increase the amount which reflects the economic bene-
fit, except that economic impact of the penalty in extraordi-
nary circumstances may serve to reduce the amount found to
reflect the economic benefit to the violator of non-compliance.
If the penalty arrived at by calculation of the economic benefit
exceeds the statutory maximum penalty, the penalty will be
reduced to the statutory maximum.115
Likewise, P.I.R.G. v. Hercules, Inc. , involved a penalty assess-
ment by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (NJDEP) for violations under both the CWA and the New
Jersey Water Pollution Act (NJWPA).116  The court cited Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo,117 in support of the proposition that,
under the CWA, courts have great discretion in assessing penal-
ties.118  That discretion is to be guided by the six factors outlined
in the CWA: (1) seriousness of the violations; (2) economic bene-
fits (if any) resulting from the violations; (3) history of such viola-
tions; (4) good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable
deduct them from its taxable income . . . . He explained that, in order to
determine the opportunity cost, he uses an equity rate which reflects how
much money the company would have been able to earn on the money it
saved as a result of not making those expenditures.
Dr. Kavanaugh explained that he determines the after-tax present value of
a delayed expenditure by first determining how much the company would
have spent on the expenditure had it made the expenditure on time, i.e.,
before the violations occurred. . . .  In making that determination, he takes
into account the expenditures which will be made in the future when the
equipment reaches its useful life and is replaced. . . . Once that first deter-
mination is made, he determines how much the company spent when it
made that expenditure at a later date, i.e., the date when it came into com-
pliance. . . .  He makes this calculation in the same way he makes the first
calculation except that he uses the later date. . . . Once he has made these
calculations of the “on-time” and delayed expenditures, he determines
their after-tax present value by applying an opportunity cost and sub-
tracting the tax savings. . . . Finally, he subtracts the after-tax present value
of the delayed expenditure from the after-tax present value of the on-time
expenditure. . . . That difference is the economic benefit to the company of
having delayed the expenditure instead of making it on time.
(citations omitted). Id.
115 Id . at *16 (internal citations omitted).
116 970 F. Supp. 363, 364-65 (D.N.J. 1997).
117 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
118 Hercules , 970 F. Supp. at 364.
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requirements; (5) economic impact of the penalty on the violator;
and (6) such other matters as justice may require.119  The court
noted that it would consider the previous assessment of penalties
against the defendant by the NJDEP, given the significant expe-
rience and expertise of the NJDEP in the area.120  The court also
noted that the factors used by the NJDEP in assessing penalties
for the defendant’s violations of the NJWPA were substantially
the same as the six factors to be used under the CWA, stating:
Since this court has no interest in duplicating the efforts of a
specialized body such as the NJDEP, it will permit arguments
by Hercules that the penalty assessed by the NJDEP was suffi-
cient and should be presumed adequate for the purposes of
this court’s assessment of a civil penalty under the Clean
Water Act.121
Further, the court declared that a presumption of adequacy
would be given to NJDEP’s assessment, provided that three fac-
tors were met in the decision-making process: “(1) there was a
meaningful degree of citizen participation; (2) there is evidence
of a careful, individualized determination based on all the rele-
vant facts; and (3) the process resulted in an effective remedy for
society sufficient to abate and deter pollution.”122
P.I.R.G. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.123 was another pen-
alty case brought under the CWA.  As in Magnesium Elektron ,
the court calculated economic benefit based on the after-tax pre-
sent value of the expenditures the company avoided or delayed
by not complying.124  The defendant argued that the district
court’s calculation of economic benefit was erroneous.125  The
court of appeals noted that “[p]recise economic benefit to a pol-
luter may be difficult to prove.  The Senate Report accompany-
ing the 1987 amendment that added the economic-benefit factor
to section 309(d) recognized that a reasonable approximation of
economic benefit is sufficient to meet a plaintiff’s burden for this
factor.”126  The lower court had calculated economic benefit by
using a letter written by the defendant’s experts to one of the
119 Id . at 364-65 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (2005)).
120 Id . at 365.
121 Id .
122 Id .
123 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
124 Id . at 79-80.
125 Id . at 80.
126 Id .
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defendant’s officers that gave the cost of hauling water to a treat-
ment facility.127  The court of appeals upheld the district court’s
estimation of economic benefit.128  Interestingly, the district
court had lowered the penalty assessed to the defendant by $1
million because of the EPA’s and NJDEP’s lack of enforcement
action.129  The court reasoned that the delay in enforcement was
partially responsible for the continued violations.130  The court of
appeals, however, rejected this argument and ordered the reduc-
tion to be removed.131
Under the CWA,132 fines for permit violations are based in
part on the estimated amount a polluter has saved by ignoring
regulations.133  In fact, agencies often employ cost-benefit com-
parisons in setting standards to allow resource consumption up to
the limit of undue (i.e., “inefficient”) societal harm.  The trend
toward more market-based solutions to environmental problems
is evidenced by the EPA’s recent “reinvention initiatives”—in-
cluding Project XL134—and outcries for tax incentives and other
economic instruments to influence the  non-industrial seg-
ments of the economy.
2. BEN Computer Model
The “BEN Computer Model”135 is an EPA software program
which calculates the economic benefit a violator derives from its
delay and/or avoidance of compliance with environmental
127 Id .
128 Id .
129 Id .
130 Id .
131 Id . at 81.
132 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (2005).
133 See  Robert R.M. Verchick, Feathers or Gold?  A Civic Economics for Environ-
mental Law , 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 100 (2001).
134 Project XL is a national EPA pilot program allowing state governments, local
governments, businesses and federal facilities to work with the EPA to develop more
business-friendly, cost-effective ways of achieving environmental protection. See
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What is Project XL? , http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.
htm.
135 In 1984, the EPA developed a computer program known as the “BEN Model”
to assist its staff in calculating the amount of economic benefit for purposes of settle-
ment negotiations. The program requires the agency user to enter data regarding the
costs that the company should have incurred to achieve timely compliance, whether
in the form of depreciable “capital investments,” “one-time non-depreciable ex-
penditures” or “annually recurring costs.”  The user also must input the date by
which the company was required to comply, the date when compliance actually was
achieved, and the anticipated penalty payment date.
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laws.136  As many laws include the penalty criterion of “economic
benefit of noncompliance,”137 the BEN Model has been used to
calculate penalties under several environmental statutes.138
“Economic benefit” is the gain that a violator theoretically re-
ceives from delaying or avoiding the costs necessary for environ-
mental compliance.139  Many courts use the “cost-avoided”
method to calculate economic benefit, which is reflected in the
BEN Model promulgated by the EPA.140  The BEN Model at-
tempts to assess the amount of money that the company ex-
pected to earn from its savings in pollution-control costs.141  In
both settlement and litigation, the EPA typically insists on recov-
ering the amount of such economic benefit.142  Otherwise, the
EPA argues, companies will have an economic incentive to vio-
late environmental laws.143
The BEN Model was based on the premise that financial re-
sources not spent on compliance are available for alternative in-
vestments that yield financial returns.  The EPA published an
explanation of this computer model, which states in part:
The BEN Model converts the inputted costs to their present value using a dis-
count/compound rate based upon the company’s weighted-average cost of capital,
while also taking into account prevailing tax and inflation rates.  The model then
compares the on-time compliance scenario (what the company should have incurred
to achieve timely compliance) with the delay compliance scenario (what the com-
pany in fact spent to achieve compliance). The difference is the company’s alleged
economic benefit.
If the case goes to trial, the EPA typically relies upon expert witnesses, rather than
the BEN Model, to prove a company’s economic benefit. See Calculation of the Eco-
nomic Benefit of Noncompliance in EPA’s Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases  64 Fed.
Reg. 32,948, 32,949 (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 BEN Notice].  However, the
approaches used by these experts often are very similar to the BEN Model’s meth-
odology. There is sharp disagreement among economists regarding whether or not
the BEN Model tends to overstate the amount of economic benefit received.
136 See 1999 BEN Notice , supra  note 135, at 32,948-49.
137 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE INSURANCE, supra note
101.
138 See 1999 BEN Notice , supra  note 135, at 32,949.
139 See id . at 32,948.
140 It appears that the model adopted by the New Jersey courts closely resembles
the BEN Model. See  Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. (PIRG) v.
Magnesium Elektron, No. 89-3193, 1995 WL 461252 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 1995); PIRG v.
Hercules, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 363 (D. N.J. 1997); PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
141 See 1999 BEN Notice , supra  note 135, at 32,949.
142 See id .
143 See id .
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If these financial resources are not used for compliance, then
they presumably are invested in projects with an expected di-
rect economic benefit to the organization.  This concept of al-
ternative investment—that is, the amount the violator would
normally expect to make by not investing in pollution con-
trol—is the basis for calculating economic benefit of noncom-
pliance. . . . In the absence of enforcement and appropriate
penalties, it is usually in an organization’s best economic inter-
est to delay the commitment of funds for compliance . . . and
to avoid certain associated costs, such as operation and main-
tenance expenses.144
144 1999 BEN Notice , supra  note 135, at 32,949.  Further, the User’s Guide to the
BEN Model explains:
BEN calculates the economic benefits gained from delaying and avoiding
required environmental expenditures.  Such expenditures can include: (1)
Capital investments (e.g ., pollution control equipment), (2) One-time non-
depreciable expenditures (e.g ., setting up a reporting system, or acquiring
land), (3) Annually recurring costs (e.g ., operating and maintenance costs).
Each of these expenditures can be either delayed or avoided.  BEN’s base-
line assumption is that capital investments and one-time nondepreciable
expenditures are merely delayed over the period of noncompliance,
whereas annual costs are avoided entirely over this period.  BEN does al-
low you, however, to analyze any combination of delayed and avoided ex-
penditures. The economic benefit calculation must incorporate the
economic concept of the “time value of money.” Stated simply, a dollar
today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow, because you can invest to-
day’s dollar to start earning a return immediately.  Thus, the further in the
future the dollar is, the less it is worth in “present-value” terms.  Similarly,
the greater the time value of money (i.e ., the greater the “discount” or
“compound” rate used to derive the present value), the lower the present
value of future costs.  To calculate a violator’s economic benefit, BEN uses
standard financial cash flow and net present value analysis techniques,
based on modern and generally accepted financial principles.  First, BEN
calculates the costs of complying on-time and of complying late, adjusted
for inflation and tax deductibility.  To compare the on-time and delayed
compliance costs in a common measure, BEN calculates the present value
of both streams of costs, or “cash flows,” as of the date of initial noncom-
pliance.  BEN derives these values by discounting the annual cash flows at
an average of the cost of capital throughout this time period. BEN can then
subtract the delayed case present value from the on-time case present value
to determine the initial economic benefit as of the noncompliance date.
Finally, BEN compounds this initial economic benefit forward to the pen-
alty payment date at the same cost of capital to determine the final eco-
nomic benefit of noncompliance.  A violator may gain illegal competitive
advantages in addition to the usual benefits of noncompliance. These may
be substantial benefits, but they are beyond the capability of BEN or any
computer program to assess. Instead BEN asks you a series of questions
about possible illegal competitive advantages so that you may identify
cases where they are relevant.
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Considerable guidance on penalty assessment comes from sec-
tion 309(d) of the CWA,145 which calls for consideration of the
following factors in determining the amount of any civil penalty:
(a) the seriousness of the violation or violations;
(b) the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation;
(c) any history of such violations;
(d) any good faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements;
(e) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator; and
(f) such other matters as justice requires.
Courts vary in how they apply these factors.  Some use a
“top-down” method, starting with the statutory maximum pen-
alty, and using the six factors to adjust downward.146  The gov-
ernment favors this approach.  Other courts use a “bottom-up”
approach, first ascertaining the economic benefit of non-compli-
ance, then adjusting upward or downward using the other five
factors to arrive at an appropriate penalty.147  “Because the stat-
ute does not prescribe either method, it appears that a court is
free to use its discretion in choosing the appropriate method.”148
These examples demonstrate the public-policy goal of prevent-
ing a polluter’s unjust enrichment.  The goals of environmental
legislation are deterrence and prevention.  This is because envi-
ronments cannot be “completely” returned to their pre-pollution
state.  Where the federal government falls short in preventing un-
just enrichment, the tort system can pick up the slack.
F. Classic Issues
In order to bring a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff’s
detriment need not represent a direct confiscation by the
tortfeasor.  It is enough to make a claim that the tortfeasor has
used the plaintiff’s property without consent, even if the use is
not incompatible with the plaintiff’s current use.  For example,
say that a plaintiff has some vacant land being held on spec for a
145 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (2005).
146 See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the “top-down” method is the most appropriate means
of assessing penalties).
147 See United States v. Mun. Auth. of Union Twp., 150 F.3d 259, 265 (3d. Cir.
1998); United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858 (S.D. Miss.
1998).
148 Union Twp., 150 F.3d at 265 (citing United States v. Smithfield Foods, 972 F.
Supp. 338, 354 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
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long-term development.  The defendant parks some equipment
there from time to time in lieu of paying for storage at a public
facility.  Under this sort of scenario, it is sufficient to show that
the defendant received an economic benefit.  The retention of
that benefit must result in an unjust enrichment at the plaintiff’s
expense.149 Difficulty in ascertaining the amount of enrichment
has been raised as a complete defense, but rejected by the Su-
preme Court.150
1. Measuring the Defendant’s Benefit
Unjust enrichment also provides a simpler avenue for proving
damages in the context of environmental and toxic torts.  The
amount of money saved, or economic benefit received, for exam-
ple, by not installing pollution-control equipment and adequately
disposing of waste is sometimes more readily ascertainable than
the harm suffered by victims of pollution.  In Hawaii’s Thousand
Friends v. City & County of Honolulu , the court measured the
economic benefit the county achieved by not complying with
proper waste disposal by stating:
There are two components to the calculation of economic ben-
efit: (1) the benefit that the city received from delayed capital
spending (i.e., money saved by delay in issuing and making
payments on general obligation bonds to finance the construc-
tion of the required pollution control equipment); and (2) the
operating and maintenance (“O & M”) expenses for the pollu-
tion control equipment that the city avoided operating during
the period compliance was delayed. The economic benefit can
be quantified by comparing the present value of the costs of
complying on time with the costs of complying late. If the costs
of complying late are less than the costs of complying as re-
quired by law, the city has enjoyed a positive economic
benefit.151
Given the difficulty of proving a speculative loss such as inter-
ference, use and enjoyment, or stigma, and given also that unjust
enrichment provides a more certain amount, it is not hard to see
why the civil justice system would benefit from allowing the
plaintiff to choose his remedy in appropriate cases.
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1(a) (Discussion Draft 2000).
150 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63
(1931).
151 Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368,
1387 (D. Haw. 1993).
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2. When is the Defendant’s Retention of Benefit Unjust?
A plaintiff-to-defendant transfer that lacks an adequate legal
basis for the transfer is unjust.152  Transfers without an adequate
legal basis that give rise to unjust enrichment claims are noncon-
sensual transfers where the transferee improperly obtains a bene-
fit.  “Transactions in which a benefit is obtained by wrongdoing
generally involve a form of taking without asking; the resulting
transfer is nonconsensual because the defendant has neglected a
duty to contract with the owner for the property or its use.”153
These enrichments can be direct or indirect.  A tortfeasor is
directly enriched by gaining something from the retention or the
taking.  For example, a defendant who sells lumber from trees
severed from a neighbor’s property is directly enriched.  This is
the classic understanding of unjust enrichment.
Indirect enrichments, or savings, are especially significant in
property-pollution cases.  A defendant often saves money by pol-
luting a neighbor’s property.  This savings is often above and be-
yond the damages actually done to the now-polluted property.
The storage of hazardous wastes, in accordance with EPA guide-
lines, is very expensive.154  A polluter can avoid these costs by
releasing the waste onto a neighbor’s property.  The polluter still
retains a benefit even after compensating the landowner for the
full value of the land.  This is clearly an instance of indirect unjust
enrichment.
The law recognizes indirect enrichment as falling within the
scope of unjust enrichment by equating restitution with the dis-
gorgement of the indirect enrichment.  When a defendant re-
ceives a net gain by acting in a way that disregards the plaintiff’s
rights, the entire gain is treated as an unjust enrichment.  This is
the case even where “the defendant’s gain may exceed both [1]
the measurable injury to the plaintiff, and [2] the reasonable
value of a license authorizing the defendant’s conduct.”155
3. Plaintiff’s Expense
The unjust enrichment must occur at the expense of the plain-
tiff.  This does not necessitate that the defendant acted wrongly
or that the plaintiff suffered an injury equal to the enrichment.
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 3(a) (Discussion Draft 2000).
153 Id .
154 See supra  text accompanying note 4.
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 3 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2000).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\20-1\OEL106.txt unknown Seq: 31 17-APR-06 13:38
Unjust Enrichment in Environmental Litigation 141
Rather, an unjust enrichment occurs at the plaintiff’s expense
when the defendant receives a benefit from the plaintiff that
would be unjust for the defendant to retain without compensat-
ing the plaintiff.156
G. Pollution Cases: Relation of the Plaintiff’s Harm
to the Defendant’s Benefit
A person “who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another” is required to make restitution to the other.157  Restitu-
tion of unjust enrichment restores money or property taken ei-
ther by mistake or with intent.158  Use-value, such as interest or
rent, of the thing taken is also part of restoration.  Thus, restitu-
tion is essentially restoration.  It is not a form of action, but a
description of the relief afforded.159
Restitution of unjust enrichment thus restores either the thing
taken or lost, or the benefit that has been gained by the taking
(disgorgement).  Whether an enrichment is unjust depends on
whether “the defendant has received benefits that in equity and
good conscience it ought not to keep.”160  Generally, good con-
science is offended when one is allowed to enrich himself un-
justly at the expense of another.161  Many claims for unjust
enrichment fail because the petitioners fail to identify both the
benefit and the retention.  As discussed infra , the “expense of
another” need be neither an out-of-pocket loss nor a harm equal
to the tortfeasor’s benefit.
The first question raised by the bad-faith polluter is whether
the foregoing “trespass and conversion” line of cases is properly
analogous.  The polluter would prefer to draw the analogy to
cases involving trespass without conversion, also known as the
“bare use” cases.162  Some contend that the violation of a land-
owner’s property rights without any other physical or economic
damage is not recoverable in damages (although injunctions to
prevent the infringement of that right remain).  “Bare use” is an-
other way of saying “no harm, no foul.”
156 Zuger v. N.D. Ins. Guar. Ass’n., 494 N.W. 2d 135, 138 (N.D. 1992).
157 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
158 DOBBS, supra  note 11, § 4.1, at 222.
159 Id .
160 Baker & Markoff, supra  note 53, at 115.
161 See Callano v. Oakwood Park Home Corp., 219 A.2d 332, 334 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1966).
162 See, e.g. , Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r., 96 S.W.2d. 1028, 1030 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
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Pollution cases are more like trespass and conversion than
bare-use cases.  First, there is a loss.  The victimized landowner
suffers economically in the form of lost property values, lost op-
portunities, lost economic development for the affected area, and
stigma.163  Second, intentional misconduct or bad-faith actions
(even in a bare-use case) lead to a disgorgement result regardless
of loss.  This must be addressed to deter the wrongful conduct.164
The classic illustration of this latter point is provided by Ed-
wards v. Lee’s Administrator165 and the Restatement of Restitu-
tion.166  In Edwards , the surface lands overlying a cave were
owned by the plaintiff and defendant.167  The surface line be-
tween their respective properties bisected the area above the
cave, but only the defendant had access to the cave.168  The de-
fendant opened the entire cave as a tourist attraction and
charged admission,  and the plaintiff filed a claim that the defen-
dant was wrongfully profiting from his land.169  The defendant
responded by claiming that the plaintiff’s property was not in any
way being injured by the use, and indeed, was restored to its orig-
inal condition from a separate and earlier injunction.170  In addi-
tion, the defendant contended that the cave was of no practical
use to the plaintiff, as it could only be entered through the defen-
dant’s land.171  The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected these
claims, holding that, as a knowing trespasser, the defendant was
accountable for “the benefits, or net profits, received by [him]
from the use of the property of the [plaintiff].”172
Initially, the court observed that the ordinary recovery for an
action for trespass was the reasonable rental value of the prop-
erty.173  After reviewing several theories of recovery, including
163 Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
164 This is especially true where there were reasonable alternatives available to
the defendant that would have avoided or minimized injury to the plaintiff class. See
Rose v. Chaiken, 453 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (“the avail-
ability of alternative means of achieving the defendant’s objective has been found to
be relevant”).
165 Edwards , 96 S.W.2d. at 1028.
166 See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 46 cmt. c, illus. 3 (Tentative
Draft 1983-84).
167 Edwards , 96 S.W.2d. at 1028-29.
168 Id . at 1029.
169 Id .
170 Id . at 1030.
171 Id .
172 Id . at 1032.
173 Id . at 1030.
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that found in the final draft of the Restatement of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, part I, section 136, the court concluded
that “the measure of recovery . . . must be the benefits, or net
profits, received by the . . . use of the property.”174  The underly-
ing philosophy of the cases discussed by the court was “that a
wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his own
wrong.”175  Thus, under the appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff
may recover the profits created by a tortfeasor’s impermissible
use and enjoyment of his land.176
At that time, allowing a plaintiff to sue for the defendant’s
profit from the land use, while no resources were removed, was
in opposition to the view expressed in the English case of Phillips
v. Hamfray , which disallowed any restitutionary claims in bare-
use cases.177  Nevertheless, Edwards  was hailed as a “welcome
departure” from the traditional view.178 Since then, American
courts have almost unanimously condemned the traditional view
as anachronistic and have either disapproved it or ignored it alto-
gether.179  Furthermore, the proposed draft Restatement rejects
the traditional view.180  Even England has repudiated it.181
The American Law Institute’s draft Restatement of Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment includes situations sounding in tort,
like that in Edwards .  For example, in the 2000 Discussion Draft
concerning general principles, the American Law Institute re-
174 Id . at 1032.
175 Id .
176 See also Nat’l Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E. 2d 771, 774-76 (Mass. 1976)
(stating that the remedy for unfair competition includes disgorgement of profits be-
cause the tortfeasor should not be permitted to speculate that profits may exceed the
injured party’s losses, thereby encouraging commission of the tort by allowing de-
fendants to retain part of the illegal gains).
177 Phillips v. Hamfray, [1883] 24 Ch. 439 (appeal taken from P.).
178 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Reporter’s Notes § 129 cmt. at 194-95
(1936). Edwards v. Lee’s Administrator  demonstrated that the law of torts and the
law of restitution have common ground:  tort law identifies those circumstances in
which a person is liable for the infliction of a non-consensual harm, measuring liabil-
ity by the extent of the harm to the plaintiff.  The law of restitution identifies those
circumstances in which a person is liable for a non-consensual benefit received, mea-
suring liability by the extent of the benefit.
179 See, e.g. , Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 236-38 (Va. 1946);
Monarch Accounting Supplies Inc. v. Prezioso, 368 A.2d 6, 10 (Conn. 1976); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1957); PALMER, supra  note
33, § 2.5, at 77-80.
180 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b, illus. 5 (Tentative Draft
2000).
181 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary
Damages , Law Commission Report No. 132 160 (1993).
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porter gave the following illustration of a restitution remedy
stemming from tort:
A repeatedly and intentionally trespasses on B’s land, avoid-
ing the higher costs of transportation by an alternate route and
hoping to avoid paying B for a license. A’s saved expenditure
(the net costs avoided or the price of a license, whichever is
higher) is an unjustified enrichment because it is the result of a
legal wrong. More specifically, A’s enrichment is the product
of A’s conscious neglect of the duty to contract with B for the
use of B’s property. A is liable to B in restitution in the
amount of A’s saved expenditure, whether or not A’s repeated
trespass has caused any injury to B’s land.182
The reporter cites the foregoing example from Raven Red Ash
Coal Co. v. Ball .183  The cautionary note is that B’s right of re-
covery is dependant upon B’s property interest in the land in-
vaded by A. In most groundwater pollution cases, the polluter
contaminates the state-owned water table below the plaintiff’s
property, as to which surface owners (1) have an undeniable
right of use, and (2) draw water that is hydrologically intercon-
nected to the contaminated water.184
Additional case law imposes the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment to compensate the impermissible use of land.  In N.C.
Corff Partnership, Inc. v. Oxy USA, Inc. , the plaintiff sued a
neighboring operator of oil and gas wells after elevated levels of
toxic chemicals were discovered in the groundwater.185  Unjust
enrichment was among the plaintiff’s claims.186  The court recog-
nized that under Oklahoma law:
A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it
is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a
benefit which has come to him at the expense of another. . . .
[It] arises not only where the expenditure by one person adds
to the property of another, but also where the expenditure
saves the other from expense of loss .187
The court stated that, in order to recover for unjust enrich-
ment, the plaintiffs “must prove not only that . . . [the defendant]
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b, illus. 5 (Tentative Draft
2000).
183 Raven Red Ash Coal Co. , 39 S.E.2d at 231.
184 See id .
185 N.C. Corff P’ship, Inc. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288 (Okla. App. Ct. 1996).
186 See id .
187 Id . at 295 (quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts  § 3
(1973) (emphasis added)).
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is responsible for contaminating the property, but also that the
contamination will not be abated, and that . . . [the defendant] in
fact has received an economic benefit thereby.”188
In Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co. , the plaintiff sued for
trespass and unjust enrichment after natural gas migrated from
the defendant’s subsurface storage formation into a formation
below the plaintiff’s property.189  The Tenth Circuit upheld the
jury’s finding that the company was unjustly enriched by its use
of the additional storage space below the plaintiff’s property.190
Specifically, it found the company was unjustly enriched by its
increased ability to store natural gas and sell it during periods of
peak demand, and that the use-value for the gas space below the
plaintiff’s property was worth at least $12 million.191  While de-
cided under a specific Kansas statute concerning the migration of
natural gas beneath property, Beck  nonetheless illustrates the
reasonableness of a recovery in restitution for the value of the
underground storage space.192
H. The Remedy or Choice of Remedies in Pollution Cases
for the Savings or Benefit Conferred
Edwards  tells us two distinct things: First, as indicated above,
wrongful or bad-faith torts (even in bare-use cases) are actiona-
188 N.C. Corff , 929 P.2d at 295; see also Moore v. Texaco, Inc., 244 F.3d 1229, 1233
(10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “performance of another’s statutory duty to reme-
diate pollution can give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment”).
189 170 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1999).
190 See id . at 1023.
191 Id . at 1022-23.
192 An important issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could recover
damages for both the trespass and the unjust enrichment claim. Id . at 1024. The
court held that the plaintiff was limited to one recovery for one wrong, and that the
remedy was the same for both claims. Id . The court phrased the remedy in the lan-
guage of unjust enrichment, stating that, “[t]he benefit that Northern received from
the landowners was the use of the . . . formation without payment of rent, for which
proper measure of damages was . . . fair rental value” Id . (emphasis added).
The case demonstrates the confusing nature of this issue.  The damages received
were clearly restitution.  But was the restitution awarded for the unjust enrichment
claim or for the trespass claim?  The court seems to be saying that this remedy is
available for both. This denies the conventional wisdom that for a tort, such as tres-
pass, only the more traditional compensatory damages are allowed.  Clearly, the
damages here were not compensatory because the plaintiff’s only injury was the
invasion of a property right. The damages were measured by “the benefit that
Northern received,” not by injury to the plaintiff, which could not be determined
with clarity. Id .  However, because there was also an unjust enrichment claim, it
cannot be said that this case sets any clear precedent.
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ble.  Second, the proper remedy is disgorgement of profits or
benefits (e.g., enhanced value, not stumpage value), and not just
fair-rental value.193
As previously indicated, to recover under the unjust-enrich-
ment doctrine, the plaintiff must show that the defendant re-
ceived a benefit and that the retention of that benefit without
payment would be unjust.  The concept of a “conferred benefit”
is construed broadly:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he . . . satisfies a
debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the other’s
security or advantage. He confers a benefit not only where he
adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the
other from expense or loss. The word “benefit,” therefore, de-
notes any form of advantage.194
Courts recognize money saved as the basis for an
unjust-enrichment case.195  This savings is also referred to as neg-
ative unjust enrichment or recoverable profit.196
In pollution cases, the unjust-benefit claim is that the polluter
improperly benefited (1) by polluting rather than spending to
control its pollution by properly disposing of its waste, and (2) by
later refusing to spend to clean the resulting mess thoroughly.  In
Branch , unjust enrichment was predicated on the money saved
by the defendant through its wrongful conduct in the specific
context of pollution.197
In Branch , the defendant Atlantic Richfield Co. sought to dis-
miss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to join indispensable par-
ties.198  In denying the defendant’s request, the court discussed
the nature of the plaintiff’s claims:
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the alleged conduct of
Defendants which Plaintiffs claim unjustly enriched Defend-
ants is delictual rather than contractual in nature.  The con-
duct is expressly alleged to be negligence and negligence per
se.  As a remedy for such alleged conduct, Plaintiffs seek dis-
gorgement of gains flowing from Defendants’ alleged wrong-
doing, in the form of money saved by Defendants by not
193 See supra  text accompanying notes 167-76.
194 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (1936).
195 See Tilghman , 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888); Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machines
Corp. , 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir. 1975); Cross v. Berg Lumber Co ., 7 P.3d 922, 936
(Wyo. 2000).
196 See Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp.  35, 36 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
197 Branch , 778 F. Supp. 35, at 36.
198 Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 539, 539-40 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
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complying with state law and Oklahoma Corporation Com-
mission rules and regulations.  Disgorgement is a restitution-
ary remedy or remedy for restitution.  The underlying basis for
disgorgement and other restitutionary remedies or tools like
quasi-contracts is the prevention of unjust enrichment.  “Resti-
tution may be sought in contract actions, tort actions, statutory
actions and others.”199
If a polluter is allowed to store hazardous waste on or under
another’s property, he or she benefits because the scenario is less
expensive than alternatives, such as sending the waste to a
properly-permitted landfill.  The defendant was enriched to the
extent it conducted its activities while avoiding the costs associ-
ated with eliminating the resulting harms.  These costs are ulti-
mately borne by the state.200  Examples of unjust enrichment
include situations in which the means or ends of the polluter’s
conduct are improper.  Here, the defendants, in order to effectu-
ate a savings for themselves, used the others’ public or private
property as a de facto waste disposal site without prior consent
or payment for that privilege.201
The ability to disgorge money unjustly saved by a polluter’s
wrongful actions was similarly recognized in Evans v. City of
Johnstown202 and Cassinos v. Union Oil Co.203  Disgorgement of
profits is an accepted remedy in equity to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.204  Thus, recovery in implied-contract actions has been
199 Id . at 540 (internal citations omitted).
200 U.S. v. Healy Tibbitts Const. Co., 607 F. Supp. 540, 542-43 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(“The portrait of a polluter indifferently standing idle while its oil spill is neutralized
at public expense—and thereafter spiritedly disavowing any responsibility for rec-
ompensing the United States—offers as compelling an example of unjust enrich-
ment as has lately been brought before the Court.”).
201 Branch , 778 F. Supp. at 35; see also DOBBS, supra  note 11, § 4.5, at 278; see
also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173
P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
202 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 206-07 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that plaintiff could proceed on a
claim of unjust enrichment against defendant municipalities for money they saved by
not properly disposing of waste materials).
203 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 584-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the fair market
cost to dispose of injected wastewater at available sites in the area during the perti-
nent period was a reasonable quasi-contractual measure of damages for the defen-
dant property owner’s trespass through injection of off-site wastewater into
plaintiff’s adjacent property, damaging plaintiff’s mineral estate).
204 See In re Investors Dev., 7 B.R. 772, 775 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980) (“It is well
settled that equity will disgorge an unjust enrichment.”); see also JAMES FISCHER,
UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 303 (1999) (“The essence of unjust enrichment and its
correlative remedy of restitution is the recovery of the benefit realized by the defen-
dant not the harm or injury sustained by the plaintiff.”).
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measured by the value of the defendant’s benefit, rather than the
amount of the plaintiff’s loss.205
II
UNJUST RETENTION
A benefit is unjustly retained if it is not obtained by consent or
paid for by the recipient under a contract—here, the polluter
who has taken and continues to profit from a de facto pollution
easement.  The unjust enrichment remedy in tort seems espe-
cially strong where the tortfeasor has intentionally enriched him-
self through a wrong against the plaintiff.206  The fact that the
tortious conduct involves pollution, and a de facto taking of a
pollution easement relative to one’s neighbors, only strengthens
the case for a disgorgement remedy.207
The notion of unjust retention is supported by basic econom-
ics.  The state and/or neighbors of the polluters bear the burdens
of pollution—an externality208—the cost of which has not hereto-
fore been borne fully by the polluting party.  From an economic
205 See Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Twp. of W. Milford, 677 A.2d 747,
753 (N.J. 1996) (stating that a contract action implied in law is similar to restitution-
ary claim, and that recovery is measured “by the amount the defendant has bene-
fited from the plaintiff’s performance”); Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 205 A.2d 744,
745 (N.J. 1964) (observing that a landowner could recover against a trespasser for
“compensation for some benefit” despite no depreciation in value of land); see also
Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 237 (Va. 1946) (stating that a per-
son who illegally uses another’s land, but does not cause diminution in land value, is
still responsible for preventing unjust enrichment under an implied-contract theory
because he received a substantial benefit as a result of his own conduct).
206 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 150-57 at 202-05 (1936); accord,  Edwards
v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
207 In commercial cases and contracts, the analysis may be different. The concept
of efficient breach suggests that a party should not be punished merely for failing to
honor a contractual promise because breach may be an economically efficient choice
for a party willing to pay the damages caused by the breach.
208 Alfred C. Pigou (1877-1959) formally elaborated on how costs and benefits
that are not included in the polluter’s market prices affect how people interrelate
with their environment.  An externality is a phenomenon that is external to markets
and, hence, does not affect how markets operate when in fact it should. See A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).  Some of the early environmental
economists who expressly called  for internalizing the costs of production and the
previously externalized costs of pollution include J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY,
AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968); A. KNEESE, R.
AYERS, & R. D’ARGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1-15 (1970).  Scholars
who have addressed this issue in the legal context include WILLIAM W. LANDES and
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 29-31 (1987); Frank B. Cross,
Natural Resource Damage Valuation , 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 271 (1989).
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point of view,209 the polluter has been unjustly enriched by: (1)
invading the fundamental private property rights of its neighbors
without consent or compensation,210 (2) undermining the public
interest in a clean environment, and (3) gaining an improper and
illegal competitive edge against its competitors.  Pollution harms
property rights and honest competitors, and so the law makes the
polluter pay to avoid unjust retention.
In an ideal scenario, a polluter and its neighbors negotiate
openly.  As noted earlier, where such negotiation is impossible
because of the covert (if not fraudulent) conduct of the polluter,
the law, in the exercise of equity, implies a contract between the
parties.211
A. Tort Remedies Create Imperfect and Special
Circumstances Necessitating Equitable Relief
Traditionally, the tort remedy for property damage has been
either restoration or the market value of the property.212  In the
case of pollution, neither remedy is always adequate, and thus
there is a need for equitable remedies, whether under a tort or
equitable cause of action.
If an actor intentionally pollutes and/or refuses to restore the
damaged environment, what happens to the neighboring land-
owner?  If his property is worth $300,000, what is the remedy?  If
the polluter only pays $300,000 or some lesser amount as FMV,
there is a de facto taking, in whole or in part, without consent or
public necessity.  In effect, the polluter pays the government rate
under its limited constitutional privilege to take private property.
Clearly, this result makes no sense.213  Moreover, it is difficult to
value the pollution easement without a real (i.e., voluntary) mar-
ket for the same.  If the property or the interest in property (i.e.,
the pollution easement) has no real market value at the time and
209 Restoration is the most efficient remedy for damage to publicly owned natural
resources. See, e.g. , R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 194 (3rd ed.
1986) (stating that restitution has an appropriate place in intentional tort cases be-
cause it makes “the tort worthless to the tortfeasor and thereby channel[s] resource
allocation through the market”).
210 Typically, polluters never ask the relevant environmental authority to con-
demn all or part of the affected property because they are unable to show the consti-
tutionally required public need and they are unwilling to pay just compensation.
211 See, e.g ., Branch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 35, 35 (W.D. Okla. 1991);
Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 S.2d 475, 483 (La. 1991).
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1977).
213 See, e.g ., Magnolia Coal Terminal, 576 So. 2d at 484.
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place of the conversion because its nature creates no general de-
mand, a FMV approach makes little or no sense.214  Finally, it
seems grossly inequitable and conducive to lawless behavior for a
polluter to knowingly avoid paying, say, $1 million in disposal or
storage charges in return for a $300,000 involuntary payment to
his neighbor after extensive and costly litigation.
The alternative remedy at law of restoration damages is impor-
tant, but arguably is not always adequate by itself.  The law often
requires a showing of special need to invoke the restitutionary
remedy,215 and this, if interpreted too stringently, is difficult to
show in many cases.  The restoration cost often is greater than
the FMV.  While this is in itself not objectionable, it may still
allow a measure of unjust enrichment in certain cases.  Moreo-
ver, laws and regulations that expressly reserve all state law
claims in tort and equity often result in minimal cleanup.  Since
regulators worry more about imminent and substantial endanger-
ments to health and the environment, a second cleanup is rarely
inconsistent with the same, or with a collateral attack on the gov-
ernment-approved remediation.216
B. The Connection Between the Wrong and the Enrichment
The simple unjust enrichment case involves the defendant en-
riching himself by taking the plaintiff’s property.  In that case, the
property needs to be returned.  As in the camera hypothetical, a
similar case involves the wrongful taking of property and its sub-
sequent sale for more than it is worth, necessitating a substitu-
tionary remedy.  In pollution cases, the storage or taking of a
pollution easement can be equated to the tortfeasor’s saving of
disposal and cleanup costs.
There are less obvious cases, in which the connection between
the wrongdoer’s enrichment and plaintiff’s property is not as di-
rect.  A direct connection is not vital, such as where the defen-
dant knowingly sells a defamatory story about the plaintiff.  The
tortfeasor is enriched at the victim’s expense, but not by transfer-
214 The wronged landholder may then waive the tort and proceed upon an implied
contract of sale to the wrongdoer himself, and in such event he is not charged as for
money had and received by him to the use of the plaintiff.  The contract implied is
one to pay the value of the property as if it had been sold to the wrongdoer by the
owner.  Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS§ 929 cmt. c (1977).
216 See Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1315 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
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ring wealth or property.  No one doubts the plaintiff may recover
under an unjust-enrichment theory.217
Likewise in Edwards , the defendant’s profits came from charg-
ing admission to access both the cave under his property (which
he had improved for that purpose) and the otherwise inaccessible
portion of the cave under the plaintiff’s property.218  There was
no “taking” from the plaintiff in the traditional sense.  Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff recovered that money on an unjust-enrichment
basis in tort.219
III
PUBLIC TRUSTEE SUITS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. Restitution to the Public Trust
States and Indian tribes, vested with authority to act as natural
resource trustees, can also bring claims for unjust enrichment.  A
state’s unjust enrichment claim arises where a party improperly
benefits by polluting instead of spending to control its waste
streams, properly dispose of its waste, and clean up the resulting
mess.  In essence, the defendants have been enriched by con-
ducting their activities, while simultaneously avoiding the costs
associated with eliminating harms.  These costs are ultimately
borne by the state, as defendants use state property as a de facto
waste disposal site.
In Wyandotte Transport Company v. United States , the Su-
preme Court held that restitution was an allowable remedy for
government, even though statutory penalties already applied.220
In Wyandotte , the government sued for the negligent sinking of a
ship in a navigable river.221  The case can be considered a toxic
tort because the sunken vessel contained chlorine.222  The court
allowed the government to be reimbursed for the expenses of
raising the ship and any cleanup involved, because statutory fines
were “hardly a satisfactory remedy for the pecuniary injury
217 Other examples would be “when a trademark or copyright owner, having suf-
fered no damage, recovers some or all of an infringer’s profits; or when the victim of
an embezzler recovers the appreciated value of the property in which his money was
invested.” Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution , 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1193
(1995).
218 Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W. 2d 1028, 1028-29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
219 Id . at 1031.
220 Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1967).
221 Id . at 193.
222 Id . at 194.
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which the negligent shipowner may inflict upon the sover-
eign.”223 The court further added, “[d]enial of such a remedy . . .
would permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a
wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his
negligence onto his victim.”224
Analysis of this result offers two possible explanations.  First,
the government recovered on a claim of unjust enrichment be-
cause the defendant would otherwise have been unjustly en-
riched by passing the expense of raising the sunken vessel to the
government.  To be analyzed in unjust enrichment, there must be
an involuntary transfer, like a mistaken payment.  In Wyandotte ,
the fact that the government was statutorily required to pay for
the cleanup of the sunken vessel meant that the defendant was
unjustly enriched.  Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has squarely held
that the “performance of another’s statutory duty to remediate
pollution can give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment.”225
A second explanation for the Wyandotte  result is that the gov-
ernment, having proved its suit in tort for negligence, was given a
restitutionary remedy.  This seems to be the more plausible anal-
ysis because the government was required to prove the different
elements of a tort, but was awarded restitution instead of the
more typical award of compensatory damages.226 In contrast to a
tort claim, an unjust enrichment claim requires no proof of
“wrong” or fault, only proof of an involuntary transfer.227
In deciding the case, the court relied heavily on the Restate-
ment of Restitution section 115, which states:
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying
things or services, although acting without the other’s knowl-
edge or consent, is entitled to restitution from the other if (a)
he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefore, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately necessary
223 Id . at 202.
224 Id . at 204.
225 Moore v. Texaco, Inc., 244 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2001).
226 Wyandotte , 389 U.S. at 205. .
227 BIRKS, supra  note 13, at 41, explains that claims in unjust enrichment can be
analyzed through a sequence of five questions: (i) Was the defendant enriched? (ii)
If so, was that enrichment at the expense of the claimant? (iii) If so, was there any
‘unjust factor’, i.e., any circumstance recognized as requiring restitution? (iv) If so,
what kind of restitutionary right arose from that unjust enrichment at the claimant’s
expense? (v) Does the enrichee have any defense which will reduce or extinguish his
liability?
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to satisfy the requirements of public decency, health, or
safety.228
This demonstrates the court’s understandable confusion over
the workings of unjust-enrichment claims.  If the claim were truly
such, only the elements of unjust enrichment, or those in the Re-
statement, would have to be proven, not negligence.
Congress has expressed a preference for disgorging money
saved by polluters.  For instance, Congress established that pen-
alties for noncompliance with laws governing air quality can be
set at a level “no less than the economic value which a delay in
compliance . . . may have for the owner of the source [of
pollution].”229
Similarly, in United States v. Smithfield Foods , Inc. , the court
stated, “[v]iolators [of the CWA] should not be able to obtain an
economic benefit vis-a-vis their competitors due to their noncom-
pliance with environmental laws.”230  In that case, the economic
benefit was $4.2 million.231  In upholding the district court’s eco-
nomic benefit calculation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, “[t]he rationale for including this measure as part of the
violators’ fine is to remove or neutralize the economic incentive
to violate environmental regulations.”232  Consequently, the
wrongdoer would not enrich himself, and the common burdens
to judicial resolution would be bypassed.
B. Other Public Trust Claims
Unjust enrichment is only one of many theories available to
the government.  For example, in an NRD case, a state may sue
under the state common law public trust doctrine or federal
Superfund law for restoration damages as well as loss-of-use
228 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 115 (1936).
229 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(d)(2)(A)(2005).
230 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 348 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(quoting Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d
64, at 80 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1109 (1991)).
231 See id . at 349.
232 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing United States v. Mun. Auth. Union Twp., 150 F.3d 259, 264 (3d. Cir. 1998)); see
also, Keeney v. Durable Wire, Inc., No. CV 91 0399750S, 1995 WL 342161 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1995) (holding a penalty should include the economic benefit of
non-compliance; otherwise, the violator and potential violators would perceive that
it pays to violate the law, creating an obvious disincentive for compliance).
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damages associated with the injured resource.233  In addition,
states may seek unjust enrichment as a remedy for the associated
trespass.  As a practical matter, full compensation does not also
permit a double recovery.  However, it is unclear what to do
when the cost of restoration plus the cost of loss of use exceeds
the amount of the unjust enrichment. Wyandotte only touches on
the issue without resolving it.234
For example, if a polluter saved $1 million by polluting public
waters rather than paying for proper disposal, and if the court
awards the trustee $2 million for restoration and loss of use,
would a further award for the unjust-enrichment claim be a
double recovery?  No court has addressed the issue.  However,
given the same facts, if restoration and loss-of-use damages to-
taled $200,000, a further award of $800,000 does not appear
problematic.  But this invites the question of whether unjust en-
richment should be viewed as a type of offset or stand-alone
claim.  If it is not an offset, and nothing in the jurisprudence sug-
gests that it is so limited, then there would be no double-recovery
problem.
CONCLUSION
A long line of precedent supports the use of unjust enrichment
in cases analogous to property-pollution cases.  These precedents
make clear three fundamental principles: (1) a party who re-
ceives an economic benefit by trespassing on and using the prop-
erty of another must pay the owner for profits received from the
use of the land;235 (2) the right to recover unjust enrichment is
separate from the right to recover damages; and (3) the right to
recover does not depend upon whether property damage has oc-
curred or whether the plaintiff would have received the bene-
fit.236  Unjust enrichment may be remedied by money damages in
233 Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource Damages , 25 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 93, 94-95 (2004).
234 See  Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 191 (1967).
235 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b (1939); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§§ 129, 151, 157 (1936); Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1031 (Ky. Ct. App.
1936) (defendant profited from cave under the plaintiff’s property); Quality Excel-
sior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 177 S.W.2d 728 732(Ark. 1944) (subsurface trespass);
Mederacke v. Becker, 205 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965); Marder v. Realty Constr.
Co., 205 A.2d 744, 745 (N.J. 1964).
236 Edwards , 96 S.W.2d at 1031; Quality Excelsior Coal , 177 S.W.2d at 732; Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Shully, 71 F.2d 772, 775 (5th Cir. 1934); Marder , 205 A.2d at 745;
Don v. Trojan Constr. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 626, 627 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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an action for restitution at law or by injunctive relief (e.g., crea-
tion of a constructive trust) at equity.237
The expanding body of case law on unjust-enrichment claims is
a natural outgrowth of the common law of torts.  As such, it
should be regarded by property-owner plaintiffs as a reasonable
and effective means of challenging polluters as well as people
who extract some form of profit from their unauthorized use of
the plaintiff’s land or resources.  The courts generally have been
responsive to these claims where they have been appropriately
raised and where any alternative claims were either unavailable
or not sufficiently responsive to the harm suffered by the
landowner.238
Calculating the damages in these claims is a demanding task
requiring the court to consider various factors and possibilities.
Disgorgement of profits, fair rental value, recovery of economic
benefit or the land’s lost value, and punitive damages are all
sources of damages for the plaintiff. Both economic benefit and
punitive damages present complicated calculations that the fed-
eral government has approached reasonably with the BEN
Model and other expert calculations.  These calculation method-
ologies should be considered by plaintiffs seeking to maximize
recovery in unjust-enrichment claims.
237 See PALMER, supra  note 33, §1.1, at 2-6. Unjust enrichment has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in many contexts, including attorney fees.  In Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co ., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970), a shareholder derivative suit, the
Court stated: “To allow the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff’s efforts
without contributing equally to the litigation expenses, would be to enrich the others
unjustly at the plaintiff’s expense.” Similarly, in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
472, 478 (1980), a shareholder class action, the Court stated that the common fund
doctrine “rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit
without contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigants’
expense.”
238 At least one court states that to satisfy the requirements of raising a federal
claim of unjust enrichment, the language of the applicable statute must first be care-
fully considered.  In fact, that court appears to have commingled statutory law and
equity in a unique analysis.  Applying the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Northern District of Oklahoma in
City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1310-11 (N.D. Okla. 2003),
vac’d pursuant to settlement  (July 16, 2003), found that when the City of Tulsa sued
several poultry businesses for polluting the city’s reservoirs with their wastewater,
the city itself had unclean hands and could only seek contribution from the busi-
nesses for their share of the cleanup costs.  Thus, although the businesses were en-
riched by their use of the reservoirs and by avoiding the cleanup, the claim of unjust
enrichment was not available to the city, although other claims survived.
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